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Verifying different sensory modality properties for concepts results in a processing cost
known as the modality-switch effect. It has been argued that this cognitive cost is
the result of a perceptual simulation. This paper extends this argument and reports
an experiment investigating whether the effect is the result of an activation of sensory
information which can also be triggered by perceptual linguistically described stimuli.
Participants were first exposed to a prime sentence describing a light or a sound’s
perceptual property (e.g., “The light is flickering”, “The sound is echoing”), then required
to perform a property-verification task on a target sentence (e.g., “Butter is yellowish”,
“Leaves rustle”). The content modalities of the prime and target sentences could
be compatible (i.e., in the same modality: e.g., visual–visual) or not (i.e., in different
modalities). Crucially, we manipulated the stimuli’s presentation modality such that half
of the participants was faced with written sentences while the other half was faced
with aurally presented sentences. Results show a cost when two different modalities
alternate, compared to when the same modality is repeated with both visual and
aural stimuli presentations. This result supports the embodied and grounded cognition
view which claims that conceptual knowledge is grounded into the perceptual system.
Specifically, this evidence suggests that sensory modalities can be pre-activated through
the simulation of either read or listened linguistic stimuli describing visual or acoustic
perceptual properties.
Keywords: modality-switch effect, property verification, priming paradigm, embodiment, grounded theories of
concepts
INTRODUCTION
Object’s properties can be perceived through different sensory modalities. Thus, while detecting
the color of a traffic light in a cross-road mainly involves the visual modality, perceiving
the melody of a violin during a classic concert mainly involves the auditory modality.
According to grounded theories of knowledge (Barsalou, 2008; for a recent discussion
see Borghi and Caruana, 2015; Pecher and Zeelenberg, 2015), sensory information is also
active when we process the concepts TRAFFIC LIGHT and VIOLIN1. In other words,
1We use uppercase italics for concepts (VIOLIN) and lowercase italics for properties of the concepts (melody) throughout the
whole manuscript.
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processing concepts would imply a re-enactment of previously
recorded and integrated perceptual information concerning
the objects or entities they refer to. Hence, a similar pattern
of neural activation in sensory systems would be preserved
in representation: while processing the concept VIOLIN, for
instance, the auditory system would re-enact states associated
with hearing its sound. This re-enactment is also known as
perceptual simulation.
According to embodied and grounded theories (see also
Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2009), the re-enactment
evoked by linguistic stimuli represents a form of simulated
experience. It is worth mentioning that the notion of simulation
varies in detail and depth (Borghi and Cimatti, 2010; for a review
see Decety and Grèzes, 2006). More specifically two slightly
different views are taken into account in the Embodied Cognition
theories. According to the first, the notion of simulation is mainly
based on the re-enactment of past sensorimotor experience
(Barsalou, 1999). The second view stresses the predictive aspect
of simulation, suggesting that the automatic simulated re-
enactment of the observed actions and objects is at the basis
of a direct form of action preparation and comprehension
(e.g., Gallese, 2009). Here we mainly focus on simulation
as a form of multimodal re-enactment of previously sensory
experiences.
A growing number of neuroimaging studies show that
modality-specific brain areas are active during conceptual
processing (for reviews, see Martin, 2001, 2007; Martin and
Chao, 2001). For instance, when people process color names
(e.g., YELLOW), color areas in the visual cortex become
active (Simmons et al., 2007). Conversely, when people process
concepts for which the auditory modality is important (e.g.,
TELEPHONE), auditory areas become activated (Kiefer et al.,
2008). These results are consistent with the claim that people
simulate concepts in sensory systems.
The behavioral literature offers further evidence in support
of the assumption that perceptual information is engaged in
conceptual processing, showing a cost for performance in terms
of speed and accuracy when two different modalities alternate,
compared to when the same modality is presented (Pecher et al.,
2003, 2004; Marques, 2006; Vermeulen et al., 2007; van Dantzig
et al., 2008). This effect, known as the modality-shifting effect or
modality-switch effect (henceforth, MSE) was initially found in a
pure perceptual study by Spence et al. (2001). Participants were
faced with a visual, tactile, or auditory signal that could appear
on the left or on the right. Their task was to detect the location
of the signal (i.e., left or right) as rapidly as possible by pressing
one of two pedals. Performance was faster and more accurate for
trials that were preceded by a same-modality trial (e.g., visual–
visual) than for trials that were preceded by a different-modality
trial (e.g., auditory-visual).
Crucially, the MSE was replicated using a conceptual task
(Pecher et al., 2003). Pecher et al. (2003) used a property
verification task (see Collins and Quillian, 1969; Conrad, 1972;
Smith et al., 1974; Glass and Holyoak, 1975; Rosch and Mervis,
1975; Solomon and Barsalou, 2001, 2004): participants were
presented with short sentences having a ‘concept can be property’
scheme (e.g., ‘BANANA can be yellow’) and had to verify whether
the property was true of the concept. Related pairs of property
verification sentences alternated throughout the task: a context
sentence (i.e., the one presented first) was always followed by a
target sentence. Properties in both context and target sentences
could be in one of six modalities (vision, audition, taste, smell,
touch, and action). The key manipulation consisted in the fact
that each target sentence could be preceded by a sentence with a
property in the same or in a different modality. Results showed
that properties were verified faster and more accurately in same-
modality trials than in different-modality trials. For instance,
participants were faster and more accurate when verifying the
property pastel for BABY CLOTHES, if they previously verified
the property yellow for BANANA (both visual) rather than the
property rustling for LEAVES (auditory context – visual target).
This finding suggests that conceptual processing strongly relies
on perceptual and motor information.
However, two possible criticisms of the study by Pecher et al.
(2003) lay on the fact that (1) their property verification paradigm
might have involved less automatic processes compared to those
that a simulation would entail (on the automaticity of simulation
see Pulvermüller, 2005; Jeannerod, 2006); (2) the MSE with
conceptual representations could be explained assuming that
concepts are abstract, amodal symbols rather than grounded in
perception and action systems (see Mahon and Caramazza, 2008
for a discussion).
As to the first criticism, indeed, it has been argued that
simulations are fast, implicit and automatic and only involve
exogenous attention. In a recent study, Connell and Lynott
(2012) linked perceptual attention to conceptual processing
(on the relationship between concepts and attention see
also Myachykov et al., 2013). These authors claimed that
while exogenous attentional mechanisms are involved when
incoming stimuli automatically grab attention, endogenous
attentional mechanisms are involved when people consciously
focus attention on a particular modality (see also Connell and
Lynott, 2010). Thus, only exogenous attentional mechanisms
would be at work during a perceptual simulation, inducing,
for instance, the automatic pre-activation of specific sensory
modalities during reading. Automatically pre-activated specific
modalities could then interfere with or facilitate the subsequent
processing of semantic information yielding the MSE (see also
Connell and Lynott, 2014). However, Pecher et al. (2003) had
participants performing a double property verification task on
each trial, one on the context and one on the target sentence.
In addition, no time limit was provided to carry out the task2.
Therefore, participants were possibly lead to rely on strategic
processes involving endogenous attention, such as constructing
a mental image of the concept and property described in
the sentences. Although mental imagery can be considered
as “the best known case of [ ] simulation mechanisms, [it]
typically results from deliberate attempts to construct conscious
representations in working memory, [whereas] other forms of
simulation often appear to become active automatically and
unconsciously outside working memory” (Barsalou, 2008, p. 619,
2Only a too slow feedback was provided when participants’ responses were slower
than 2 s.
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see also Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2012; Kiefer and Barsalou,
2013). For instance, Pulvermüller et al. (2000) showed that
semantic activation in the sensorimotor cortex in passive reading
tasks was present ∼ 200 ms after word onset which would
reflect stimulus-triggered early lexico-semantic processes (i.e.,
simulation) rather than post-lexical processes (i.e., imagery, see
also Pulvermüller, 2005; on the generation of mental images
see Farah et al., 1989). Since in Pecher et al.’s (2003) paradigm
participants had to perform a property verification task also on
the context sentence and each sentence was presented until a
response was given, one could reasonably argue that post-lexical
processes involving endogenous attentional mechanisms could
explain the MSE.
As to the second criticism, van Dantzig et al. (2008)
sought evidence for the involvement of sensory information in
conceptual processing that could not be explained by amodal
symbols. According to amodal symbols accounts of concepts
(Collins and Quillian, 1969; Smith and Medin, 1981; Barsalou
and Hale, 1993), modal representations are turned into abstract,
amodal symbols that represent knowledge about experience.
Although being amodal, these symbols might still be organized
so that to reflect their modality. The MSE with conceptual
representations (Pecher et al., 2003) could hence hinge on
connections between these symbols. van Dantzig et al. (2008)
investigated the effect of a perceptual task such that of Spence and
colleagues on a conceptual task such that of Pecher et al. (2003).
More specifically, the authors asked participants to perform a
perceptual left/right spatial discrimination task followed by a
conceptual property verification task, with the latter used as the
target task. On each trial, participants first detected left/right
visual, auditory or tactile signals (i.e., a light flash, a tone or a
vibration), as in Spence et al. (2001), and then judged whether
a visual, auditory or tactile property was true of a concept, as
in Pecher et al. (2003). Results indicate that participants were
faster at verifying whether a property was true of a concept if that
property was in the same sensory modality as the immediately
preceding perceptual signal. Hence, participants, for example,
were faster at verifying that BABY CLOTHES are pastel if they
previously detected a light flash rather than a tone or a vibration.
This finding provides evidence that pure perceptual processing
(i.e., perceiving stimuli without any semantic meaning) affects
the activation of conceptual processing. Since no meaningful
relationship existed between the perceptual signals of the first task
and the concepts of the second task the authors could conclude
that the MSE cannot be explained by amodal symbols.
The present study aims at investigating whether the MSE
is the result of the activation of sensory information when
exogenous attentional mechanisms are involved. To this end,
we introduced two key modifications of Pecher et al. (2003)
and van Dantzig et al.’s (2008) studies. First, we implemented
a priming paradigm in which context sentences required no
task and were presented for a limited amount of time (from
now on we will refer to these sentences as “prime sentences”).
By using such a priming paradigm we aimed at preventing
participants from deliberately drawing upon strategic processing
for comprehending prime sentences. Our aim was to rule out
the possibility that the involvement of sensory information
in language comprehension was the consequence of a late
post-lexical strategy to imagine objects and objects properties.
Given that recent studies (Trumpp et al., 2013, 2014) showed
that subliminally presented sound and action words can activate
auditory and motor systems, we reasonably hypothesized to find
the MSE although no instructed task was required on prime
sentences presented for a limited amount of time. The second
key difference is that we used prime sentences that made a
linguistic description of the pure perceptual stimuli used in
Spence et al. (2001) and in van Dantzig et al. (2008) studies so
that to exclude connections between amodal symbols as a possible
explanation of the effect. Given that language comprehension
involves the construction of a perceptual simulation (Barsalou,
1999; Zwaan, 2004), and that perceptual simulations only involve
exogenous attentional mechanisms, it is likely that reading or
listening to a linguistic description of a pure perceptual stimulus
could pre-activate specific sensory modalities, which could then
facilitate or interfere with the processing of subsequent semantic
information.
Moreover, in order to avoid any possible semantic association
between prime and target sentences, concepts were either
semantically unrelated or low semantically related. In Appendix
A we report a norming study that we have conducted to assess
the semantic relatedness of our stimuli (see also Marques, 2006
on the effects of semantic relatedness). Our participants were
first presented with a prime sentence describing a LIGHT or
a SOUND’s perceptual property (e.g., “LIGHT is flickering”;
“SOUND is echoing”) and then with a target sentence (e.g.,
“BUTTER is yellowish”, “BRUSHWOOD crackle”) upon which a
property verification judgment was to be made.
Finally, we also included a further manipulation by
introducing neutral prime stimuli, that is, prime stimuli
which did not convey any sensory information. Our purpose
was to compare performances on target sentences preceded by
sensory information (i.e., visual and auditory prime sentences)
with performances on target sentences that were not preceded
by sensory information (i.e., neutral prime sentences). Since
neutral prime items were not expected to trigger a perceptual
simulation, that is, they were not expected to involve any
attentional mechanisms which could pre-activate a specific
sensory modality, we either predict neither facilitation nor
interference due to the fact that participants were unable to
pre-activate a sensory modality.
We ran an Experiment in which prime and target sentences
conveying both visual and auditory contents were presented
either visually or aurally. We predicted to find the MSE even with
this modified property verification paradigm. In other words, we
expected to find a better performance when prime and target
sentences share the same modality compared to when they do
not.
METHODS
Participants
Sixty-four students from the University of Bologna (43 females;
mean age: 20.26, SD: 1.58) participated in this study in return for
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course credits. All participants were Italian native speakers, had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing by self-report,
and were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the two between-subjects
conditions (visual vs. auditory). The experiment was approved by
the Psychology Department’s ethical committee of the University
of Bologna. Written informed consent was obtained from all
individual participants included in the study. Minors did not take
part in this study.
MATERIALS
Prime Items
We used 96 prime items. Forty-eight consisted of 24 visual
and 24 auditory concept-property pairs. The concepts presented
were always “LIGHT” and “SOUND” and the properties were
adjectives associated with them (e.g., “flickering/echoing”, for
the visual and auditory concepts, respectively). Twenty-four
properties were used, 12 for the visual and 12 for the
auditory prime sentences. These properties were repeated once
throughout the experiment. Twenty properties out of 24 were
taken from the norming study by Lynott and Connell (2009),
who classified several object’s properties along a unimodality –
multimodality continuum. The twenty properties we selected
from their pool were all unimodal, being mainly perceived
either through the sense of sight or through the sense of
hearing. Lynott and Connell (2009) found indeed that using
unimodal properties instead of multimodal ones leads to a
markedly larger MSE. Since our experimental design needed
24 properties, following Lynott and Connell’s (2009) combined
criterion, we selected four further properties after 50 Italian
adjectives had been rated by 22 participants (see Appendix B).
For an overview of the visual and auditory prime sentences see
Appendix C.
The other 48 prime items consisted of neutral stimuli, that
is, for the visual condition a meaningless strings of symbols
(e.g., # ◦ ˆ ? ∗) and for the auditory condition a white noise. Both
served to create a neutral modality compared to the same and
different ones.
Target Sentences
Weused 96 target sentences: 48 critical target sentences, consisted
of half visual and half auditory concept-property pairs taken
from the van Dantzig et al.’s (2008) study. In these critical pairs
the property was always true of the concept (e.g., “BUTTER is
yellowish”, “BRUSHWOOD crackles”). Each pair was used only
once in both the visual and auditory condition of the experiment.
Two properties were repeated once across the pairs, although
paired with different concepts (i.e., “a BEE buzzes”, “a FLY
buzzes”; “BROCCOLI is green”, “SPINACH is green”). For an
overview of the visual and auditory target sentences see Appendix
C. The remaining 48 stimuli were filler sentences, always taken
from van Dantzig et al. (2008). In the filler sentences the property
was always false of the concept. Twelve filler sentences had a
false visual property (e.g., “the WATER is opaque”), 12 had a
false auditory property (e.g., “the COMB sings”), whereas the
remaining 24 filler sentences had a false property that did not
belong to any modality (e.g., “the BED is sleepy”). This latter type
of fillers was used in order to avoid participants from basing their
answers on a superficial word-association strategy, rather than on
deeper conceptual-processing (see also Solomon and Barsalou,
2004).
For both the visual and auditory condition, each participant
was presented in total with 96 prime sentences (48 modal and 48
neutral) followed by 96 target sentences (48 critical and 48 filler)
throughout the experimental session. Prime and target itemswere
randomly combined to form same, different and neutral modality
conditions. Each target sentence appeared in the same, different,
and neutral modality conditions, counterbalanced across lists.
This resulted in a comparable distribution of semantic relatedness
and stimulus size measures across experimental conditions. To
sum up, the critical targets could be combined with: (1) a
neutral prime item (neutral modality); (2) a same-modality prime
sentence (visual–visual; auditory–auditory, samemodality) or (3)
a different-modality prime sentence (visual-auditory, auditory-
visual, different modality).
Procedure
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. Participants sat
in front of a computer screen, at a distance of about 60 cm.
For the visual condition, each trial started with the presentation
of a fixation cross (0.5 cm × 0.5 cm) for 500 ms. Immediately
after the fixation, the prime sentence appeared in the middle of
the screen for 1500 ms. Then, the target sentence was displayed
on the center of the screen until a response was given or until
3000 ms had elapsed. Prime and target sentences ranged from
5.9 to 17.3 cm (from 9 to 29 characters) which resulted in a
visual angle range between 5.6◦ and 16.5◦. All words were bold
lowercase Courier new 18. These measures were the same across
all conditions. Participants were instructed to read the prime and
target sentences and then to judge, as quickly and accurately as
possible, whether in each target sentence the property was true
of the concept. Participants underwent a short practice session of
24 stimuli (different from those used in the experimental blocks),
during which a feedback was given about their response. For the
auditory condition, the procedure was the same, except that (1) a
“bip” sound was presented in alternative to the fixation cross in
order to announce the beginning of a new trial; (2) the prime and
the target sentences were presented aurally, through headphones,
for 2000 ms and 4000 ms, respectively. In both the visual and the
auditory condition, half of the participants pressed the “s” and “k”
keys of a “qwerty” keyboard when the property was, respectively,
true and false of the concept, that is, when the target was a critical
or a filler sentence, respectively. The other half of the participants
was assigned to the reverse mapping.
In order to control for sequence effects, we avoided to present
the same modality for more than two consequent trials. For
example, a prime sentence in the visual modality could be
followed by another visual prime sentence only once. Then an
auditory or neutral prime had to be shown. The same rule held
for the target sentences. Two different sequences, composed
of the same 192 concept-property pairs, were built. In both
visual and auditory conditions, the sequence presentation was
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balanced across participants, such that half of the participants
was presented with one sequence and the remaining ones with
the other.
Participants underwent two blocks of 48 prime sentences
followed by 48 target sentences each (24 critical and 24 filler)
and could take a short break between them. The experiment
lasted ∼ 20 min.
RESULTS
Responses to filler sentences were discarded. Omissions (3.74%),
Incorrect responses (17.90%) and RTs faster/slower than the
overall participant mean minus/plus 2 SD (3.61%) were excluded
from the analyses.
Mean Response Times (RTs) of the correct responses were
submitted to a Repeated Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with
Modality (same vs. different vs. neutral) as the within-subject
factor and Condition (visual vs. auditory) as the between-subjects
factor3 (see Table 1 and Figure 1 for the results).
3In order to control for items variability, we conducted a Univariate ANOVA with
Target (i.e., critical concept-property pairs) as a fixed factor and Modality as a
random factor. Crucially, for both the visual and auditory conditions, the Target
x Modality interaction was not significant, Fs < 1.1, ps > 0.28, η2p < 0.062. Since
these results ruled out the possibility that the effect was due to some particular
target among the others, we decided to report and discuss the ANOVA in the main
text.
TABLE 1 | Mean Response Time (RTs) (in Milliseconds) with Standard
Deviations in parenthesis, as a Function of Modality (same, different,
neutral) for both visual and auditory conditions.
Visual Condition Auditory Condition
Same 1538 (178.3) 2462 (202.2)
Different 1588 (206.5) 2552 (245.4)
Neutral 1676 (222.2) 2756 (349.1)
MSE 50∗ 90∗
The MSE is computed by subtracting RTs in the same modality from RTs in the
different modality. Asterisks denote significant differences.
FIGURE 1 | Mean Response Times (RTs) (in Milliseconds) as a Function
of Modality (same, different, neutral) for both visual and auditory
conditions. Bars are standard Errors.
Results indicated that the main effect of Modality,
F(2,124) = 58.32, MSE = 13302.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.485, was
significant. Paired-sample t-tests showed that decision latencies
for same modality targets (M = 2000 ms, SD = 502.73 ms)
were shorter than for different modality targets (M = 2070 ms,
SD = 535.67 ms) t(63) = 5.7, p < 0.001, and decision latencies
for neutral modality targets (M = 2216 ms, SD = 616.95 ms)
were longer than for both same and different modality targets
t(63) = 8.1, p< 0.001, t(63) = −6.4, p< 0.001.
The main effect of Condition, F(1,62) = 320.32,
MSE = 146787.41, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.838, resulted as significant,
showing that the auditory condition was slower than the visual
one (2590 ms vs. 1600 ms, respectively). However, it is worth
mentioning that this result is due to a technical specification
in the procedure: aurally presented prime and target sentences
lasted longer than the visual ones, considering that spoken
sentences need to be listened to until the end before participants
could be able to release a response, while visually presented
sentences were completely available at once.
The interaction between the Modality and Condition factors
was significant, F(1.4,87.1) = 7.88, MSE = 18941.26., p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.113.
Paired-sample t-tests in the visual condition showed that
decision latencies for same modality targets were faster than for
different modality targets t(31) = 3.2, p< 0.01, whereas decision
latencies for neutral modality targets were slower than for both
same and different modality targets t(31) = 6.5, p < 0.001,
t(31) = −4.1, p < 0.001. Similarly, paired-sample t-tests in
the auditory condition showed that decision latencies for same
modality targets were faster than for different modality targets
t(31) = 4.9, p < 0.001, whereas decision latencies for neutral
modality targets were slower than for both same and different
modality targets t(31) = 6.5, p < 0.001, t(31) = −5.4, p < 0.001.
In order to investigate the difference between the magnitude
of the MSEs found, we run an additional Univariate ANOVA
with the magnitude of the MSEs as dependent variable and the
Condition as the only between-subjects factor. The magnitude of
MSEs was computed by subtracting the mean RT for the same
modality from the mean RT for the different modality. Results
showed that the MSE found for the visual condition (50 ms)
did not differ from the one found for the auditory one (90 ms),
F(1, 62) = 2.8, p = 0.10, η2p = 0.043.
In order to exclude a speed accuracy trade-off, mean of
the incorrect responses and omissions were submitted to an
ANOVA with the same factors as those of the RTs analysis.
As to the incorrect responses, neither the main effects, nor the
interaction were significant, Fs < 2, ps > 0.74, η2p < 0.004.
As to the omissions, results indicated that the main effect of
Modality F(2,124) = 11.32, MSe = 36.22, p < 0.001,η2p = 0.155
was significant. In addition, the interaction between Modality
and Condition was significant, F(2,124) = 4.31, MSe = 51.35,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.065. Paired sample t-tests showed that
in the visual condition participants made more omissions in
the neutral modality (3.7%) than in the different one (1.4%),
t(31) = 2.5, p < 0.05. While in the auditory condition all
the comparisons resulted significant showing that participants
made less omissions in the same modality (1.3%) than in the
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different one (3.2%), t(31) = 2.3, p < 0.05, whereas omissions
in the neutral modality (7.6%) outreached omissions in both
different and same modalities, t(31) = 2.6, p < 0.05, t(31) = 3.3,
p< 0.05.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the current study was to investigate whether the
MSE is the result of the activation of sensory information
due to exogenous attentional mechanisms. We used a different
paradigm from previous studies in order to exclude strategic
processing and amodal symbols accounts of concepts as possible
explanations of the effect. In line with the hypotheses, our
findings showed a robust MSE, that is, a facilitation for the
processing of those target sentences the modality of which
was formerly primed by a linguistically described perceptual
stimulus. In other words, participants were faster when they
responded to a target sentence in the same modality as
the previous prime sentence rather than different. These
results confirm that when the target’s modality correspond
to the one pre-activated by the content of the prime
sentence, RTs are speeded, while when these modalities do not
correspond the time needed to complete the task is slowed
down.
It is worth noting that our findings also showed slower
RTs and a higher percentage of omissions for the neutral
modality compared to the different modality. One might
argue that the different modality could be expected to be
the slowest modality. Indeed, activating information that does
not correspond with what has to be processed later (i.e.,
different modality) should interfere with the processing of
subsequent information and, thus, should require longer RTs
overall. However, the slowest performances observed with the
neutral modality were possibly due to the fact that in this
case the prime items (i.e., meaningless strings of symbols or
white noise) were perceptually non-informative. Unlike the visual
and auditory prime sentences, the neutral prime did not pre-
activate any specific sensory modality, neither correspondent
nor non-correspondent. If the account for the MSE and
the hypothesis that a neutral prime do not pre-activate any
sensory modality are correct, we could assume that the neutral
prime did not trigger any perceptual simulation. Since no
perceptual simulation took place with neutral prime items,
participants could not take advantage of a general activation
of the sensory system and this consequently resulted in an
overall delay and a higher occurrence of omissions in the
processing of the target sentences. This result is in line with a
recent study by Connell et al. (2012), in which the conceptual
processing of non-manipulable objects (e.g., cars or windmills)
was not influenced by either a prior tactile or proprioceptive
stimulation, showing that perceptually informative stimuli
implied no facilitation effect but rather slowed down the RT
needed to complete a task on perceptually non-informative
stimuli.
A potential concern is that participants could rely on a word
association strategy to perform the property verification task
upon target sentences. However, in the current experiment
participants could not carry out a superficial processing
of stimuli, using only word-level representations, for at
least two reasons. First, the semantic domains across
prime and target sentences were very distant to allow for
a word association strategy (see also Marques, 2006): while
target sentences described perceptual properties of objects,
prime sentences described properties of two perceptual
categories (i.e., light and sound), hence no main semantic
association was available across them. Second, in order
to avoid participants using the word association strategy,
we drew upon highly associated concepts and properties
on false trials (i.e., fillers). Indeed, previous studies (Smith
et al., 1974; James, 1975; McCloskey and Glucksberg, 1979)
showed that manipulating the difficulty of false trials varies
the depth of processing on true trials (see also Solomon and
Barsalou, 2004). Therefore, rather than have participants reject
unassociated false properties for concepts in the filler trials
(e.g., unripe for BED), we had participants reject associated
ones (e.g., sleepy for BED). For associated false properties,
participants could not respond “false” on the basis of the
word association strategy because the concept and the
property were actually somehow associated (i.e., sleepy
people go to bed). Thus, in order to determine whether the
property was true of the concept, participants must access
conceptual knowledge for BED and sleepy and realize, for
instance, that rather than being sleepy a bed is used by sleepy
people.
Overall, the results of the present study boost and broaden
previous findings which showed a significant MSE during
an on-line perceptual task (Spence et al., 2001), a property
verification task (Pecher et al., 2003) and across perceptual
and conceptual tasks (van Dantzig et al., 2008). More
broadly, our results support the accounts of the role of
perceptual attention on conceptual processing (Connell
and Lynott, 2010, 2012, 2014) showing that exogenous
attentional mechanisms are at work during perceptual
simulation and are responsible for the MSE. Although we
cannot completely rule out that the MSE we found is due to
strategic or imagery processes, the use of a standard priming
paradigm represents an important difference compared
to previous work. Indeed, while in previous studies the
sensory modality was likely to be strategically activated
when performing the task on the context sentence, in our
experiment we found a MSE even though participants were
not required to perform any task on the prime sentences.
That is, in our experiment it was completely unnecessary
to directly and explicitly pre-activate a specific sensory
modality, therefore the MSE we found is likely to be
due to an implicit and indirect pre-activation of sensory
modalities. Ultimately, we showed that the MSE also
occurs when participants are prevented from drawing upon
strategic processing, furthering the hypothesis that the MSE
arises from a simulation process during which exogenous
attention operates. In addition, we showed that not only
a perceptual stimulus (van Dantzig et al., 2008) but also
a perceptual linguistically described stimulus triggers the
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pre-activation of a sensory modality: reading or listening to
a sentence describing a light or a sound’s perceptual property
sufficed to spark off a simulation, even though no task was
required on that sentence.
CONCLUSION
The simulation of an object varies considerably across
occasions. When reading or listening to a sentence
involving a particular object in a certain situation, implicit
perceptual attention (i.e., exogenous attention) activates a
specific modality. If that modality had been previously
activated by either a perceptual stimulus or a perceptual
linguistically described stimulus, the processing of semantic
information that relates to that modality in the sentence
is facilitated. This is far from implying that any given
object does only relate to a certain modality. Rather,
other relevant modalities might be temporarily inhibited.
In facts, modalities represented in simulations vary on the
basis of their activation. Future exploration of the MSE
could use this modified property verification paradigm
with multimodal concepts in order to investigate what
happens when multiple modalities compete during a
simulation.
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